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Verifying competitive equilibria in dynamic economies
Abstract
In this paper I derive a sucient condition for a numeri-cally computed -equilibrium of a dynamic
stochastic economy with heterogeneous agents to be close to an exact equilibrium. If the economic
fundamentals are semi-algebraic, one can verify computationally whether this condition holds. The
condition can be interpreted economically as a robustness requirement on the set of -equilibria that form
a neighborhood of the computed approximation.
I use this method of 'self-validating computation' to prove that in realistically calibrated stochastic
overlapping generation models, competitive equilibria can often be extremely well approximated by
cubic functions, mapping the current shock and the beginning-of-period wealth-distribution to current
endogenous variables.
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Abstract
In this paper I derive a sufficient condition for a numerically computed -equilibrium
of a dynamic stochastic economy with heterogeneous agents to be close to an exact
equilibrium. If the economic fundamentals are semi-algebraic, one can verify computa-
tionally whether this condition holds. The condition can be interpreted economically
as a robustness requirement on the set of -equilibria that form a neighborhood of the
computed approximation.
I use this method of ’self-validating computation’ to prove that in realistically cal-
ibrated stochastic overlapping generation models, competitive equilibria can often be
extremely well approximated by cubic functions, mapping the current shock and the
beginning-of-period wealth-distribution to current endogenous variables.
∗I thank seminar participants at the 2008 CRETE summer conference at Warwick and in particular
Jean-Francois Mertens for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine stationary dynamic economies with heterogeneous agents and pos-
sibly incomplete financial markets. I show that if economic fundamentals are semi-algebraic,
i.e. per period utility- and production-functions can be described by finitely many polyno-
mials (see e.g. Blume and Zame (1993) or Kubler and Schmedders (2008)), one can prove
numerically that a computed -equilibrium provides a good approximation to an exact equi-
librium. This is done by creating a set of -equilibria around the computed approximation
and by verifying that if endogenous variables next period lie in this set, the conditions
necessary for competitive equilibrium ensure that endogenous variables in the current pe-
riod must lie in this set. I show that this verification can be done relatively efficiently by
using methods from polynomial optimization and that therefore the method can be used
for medium-sized dynamic stochastic models. Since it is checked computationally that the
candidate approximate equilibrium is close to an exact equilibrium, I refer to this method
as self-validating computation1.
Applied researchers routinely compute -equilibria of dynamic stochastic economies al-
though almost nothing is known about the nature of exact equilibria in these models.
Unfortunately, the set of -equilibria in these economies might be very large and the com-
puted approximation might be nowhere close to an exact equilibrium (see e.g. Kubler and
Schmedders (2005)). While it is clearly not computationally feasible to compute the set of all
-equilibria, it is possible to derive a simple and economically sensible robustness-condition
on a set of  -equilibria that ensures that this set contains an exact equilibrium.
I define a set of -equilibria to be robust if it satisfies the following property. Suppose at
date T economic fundamentals are perturbed so that from T onwards the new competitive
equilibrium realizes in the -equilibrium set. Then robustness of this set requires that up
to T the endogenous variables of the competitive equilibrium in which all agents anticipate
the changes at T also realize in the set. I argue in the paper that it is economically sensible
to focus on robust -equilibrium sets. The main reason for introducing this concept is that
robustness ensures that an -equilibrium set contains an exact equilibrium and that one
can effectively check if a (semi-algebraic) -equilibrium set is robust. For semi-algebraic
economies, robust -equilibrium sets that are semi-algebraic exist for all  > 0.
While the theoretical analysis is conducted using abstract equilibrium sets, one has to
consider recursive -equilibria for the practical error analysis. Computational algorithms
typically use recursive methods to approximate equilibrium sets numerically and for this
-equilibria are written as functions (or correspondences) mapping the state of the economy
into current endogenous variables. If this is the case, one of course wants to verify that the
computed recursive -equilibrium is close to an exact equilibrium for all permissable values
of the state. In order to do so, I construct candidate robust -equilibrium sets by creating
1There is a large related literature in numerical mathematics on self-validating computation – see e.g.
Rump (2005) for an overview.
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a strip around a computed recursive -equilibrium and verify that the -equilibrium set is
robust for all relevant initial values of the state.
Throughout the paper, I take it as given that a candidate approximate equilibrium has
been computed by some existing method and that this is described by a continuous (policy-)
function ρˆ that is semi-algebraic. While the existence of a recursive exact equilibrium is in
general not guaranteed (Citanna and Siconolfi (2008) give conditions for generic existence of
recursive equilibria in economies with overlapping generations), recursive epsilon-equilibria
always exist. However, typically there is no guarantee that a recursive -equilibrium can
be described by continuous functions. This paper is is not about the computation of -
equilibria but asks how it can be verified that a recursive -equilibrium is close to an exact
equilibrium. Even if there is a recursive -equilibrium with a continuous policy-function,
it is not guaranteed that the construction of a candidate -equilibrium set always gives a
robust -equilibrium set. The method therefore has to be judged by its performance in
applications.
In this paper, as an example, I study a stochastic economy with overlapping generations.
In many applications (e.g. Rios-Rull (1996) among many others) researchers routinely
compute approximate equilibria for versions of this model and find that in fact low degree
polynomials suffice for very good approximations. This might strike one as surprising since
it is well known that in many dynamic economic models with overlapping generations the
set of competitive equilibria can be almost arbitrarily wild. In particular the issue of
indeterminacy of equilibria in deterministic olg models received a lot of attention and it
is now well understood that extremely restrictive assumptions are needed to guarantee
local uniqueness (see e.g. Kehoe and Levine (1990)). But this obviously says little about
the existence (or non-existence) of simple equilibria that can be approximated by low-
degree polynomials or by piece-wise polynomials. As Kehoe and Levine (1990) point out, in
deterministic olg models the fact that the equilibrium set is complicated does not necessarily
imply anything about practical computation of equilibria. In fact I compute two robust -
equilibria for the example-economy in their paper which displays indeterminate equilibria
and show that they can be extremely well approximated by cubic functions.
It is not known, under which conditions competitive equilibria in dynamic stochastic
models can be well approximated by simple functions. Using the possibility of self-validating
computation, I show in this paper that for interesting classes of realistically calibrated
dynamic models with overlapping generations, cubic polynomials in fact provide an excellent
approximation to exact equilibria. In the models I consider, little can be said theoretically
about the equilibrium, in particular, it is not clear under which conditions the policy-
correspondences are continuous. It is clear that they are not polynomial and in the presence
of trading constraints, they will not be continuously differentiable. However, for realistic
parameter-values, they can be approximated well by cubic or piecewise cubic functions.
In the literature on Markovian equilibria in stochastic games with continuous state-
space, it has been observed that for games arising from non-exponential discounting, there
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exist very ill-behaved equilibria (see e.g. Krusell and Smith (2003)). Numerical work, on
the other hand, finds very well-behaved epsilon equilibria. However, there are almost no
proofs for existence of continuous or smooth consumption rules (i.e. well behaved equilibria)
(see Judd (2008) or Morris (2002) for some examples). In this paper, I focus on competitive
equilibria and the methods are not directly applicable to games. As Duffie et al. (1994)
point out, equilibrium in stochastic games fits into their general characterization of dynamic
equilibria (which is similar to the one I use in this paper) only if one focuses on correlated
equilibrium with publicly observed messages. It is subject to further research how the
methods can used to make statements about Markov-perfect equilibria in stochastic games.
For dynamic models with a single agent, Santos and his co-authors have developed suf-
ficient conditions under which they can give explicit error bounds both on policy functions
and on allocations ( see e.g. Santos and Vigo (1998) or Santos (2000)). Under these condi-
tions, error bounds on allocations can be derived from Euler equation residuals. However,
most of these results do not generalize to models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets. So far, no sufficient conditions had been derived which allow the derivation of
error bounds on computed equilibrium prices and allocations in the models considered in
this paper. Kubler and Schmedders (2005) show that in models with heterogeneous agents,
-equilibria can be interpreted as exact equilibria of close-by economies. Their paper does
not make any statements about the set of  equilibria or how -equilibria are related to
exact equilibria of the given stationary economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I abstractly describe the
economy, define robust -equilibrium sets and prove the main theoretical result that relates
robust -equilibria to exact competitive equilibrium. Section 3 introduces recursive meth-
ods and relates the theoretical result to the self-validating computation of a competitive
equilibrium. I argue in this section that it can be verified if a recursive -equilibrium is
close to an exact equilibrium by solving a series of constrained optimization problems. Sec-
tion 4 applies the method to examine simple dynamic equilibria in stochastic models with
overlapping generations.
2 An abstract model
In order to formally define a competitive equilibrium and to present the main theoretical
result, I first introduce a general stochastic dynamic framework that fits both models with
overlapping generations and models with infinitely lived agents and incomplete markets.
2.1 The Dynamic Economy
I consider a general abstract formulation of dynamic general equilibrium. Duffie et al. (1994)
use a similar framework (not assuming differentiability and semi-algebraic fundamentals,
as I do) and show in their paper that it encompasses general equilibrium models with
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overlapping generations as well as models with infinitely lived agents. It will turn out that
most dynamic general equilibrium models used in applications fit the framework.
Time and uncertainty are represented by a countably infinite tree Σ. Each node of the
tree, σ ∈ Σ, is a finite history of shocks σ = st = (s0, s1, . . . , st) for a given initial shock
s0. The process of shocks (st) is assumed to be a Markov chain with finite support S. To
indicate that st
′
is a successor of st (or st itself), I write st
′  st. The number of elements
in S is S. The S × S transition matrix is denoted by pi. By a slight abuse of notation, for
σ′  σ, I write pi(σ′|σ) to denote the conditional probability of σ′ given σ.
I consider dynamic economic models where an equilibrium can be characterized by a
system of semi-algebraic equalities and weak inequalities relating current-period exogenous
and endogenous variables to endogenous and exogenous variables one period ahead. Exam-
ples of such conditions are individuals’ Euler equations, firms’ first-order conditions, and
market-clearing equations for goods or financial assets.
A subset A ⊂ Rn is a semi-algebraic subset of Rn if it can be written as the finite union
and intersection of sets of the form {x ∈ Rn : g(x) > 0} or {x ∈ Rn : f(x) = 0} where f
and g are polynomials in x with coefficients in R, that is, f, g ∈ R[x]. Let A ⊂ Rn be a
semi-algebraic set. A function φ : A→ Rm is semi-algebraic if its graph {(x, y) ∈ A×Rm :
y = φ(x)} is a semi-algebraic subset of Rn+m. Blume and Zame (1993) and Kubler and
Schmedders (2008) discuss in detail the assumption of semi-algebraic fundamentals in finite
exchange economies.
Current period endogenous variables are denoted by z ∈ RM . I assume that the system
of inequalities characterizing equilibrium can be written as follows.
h(s¯, z¯, z1, . . . , zS) = 0, g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0, (1)
where for each fixed s ∈ S, h and g are continuous semi-algebraic functions. The arguments
(s¯, z¯) denote the exogenous state and endogenous variables for the current period. The
vector zs ∈ RM denotes endogenous variables in the subsequent period in state s.
A competitive equilibrium is then a process (z(st)) such that for each st
h(st, z(st), z(st, 1), . . . , z(st, S)) = 0, g(st, z(st)) ≥ 0 (2)
It will turn out to be useful to describe a competitive equilibrium not by infinite se-
quences but by a set that consists at least all elements of the sequence but might also
contain several equilibria at the same time.
Definition 1 An equilibrium set is a set Z = Z1 × . . .×ZS ⊂ RMS , such that for all s¯ ∈ S
and all z¯ ∈ Zs¯, g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0 and there exist (z1, . . . , zS) ∈ Z such that
h(s¯, z¯, z1, . . . , zS) = 0.
Clearly, the existence of a (non-empty) equilibrium set is equivalent to existence of a
competitive equilibrium.
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Given the equilibrium equations (1), I define a backward operator to map variables
next period into variables in the current period that are consistent with the equilibrium
conditions. That is, given sets K0,K1, ...,KS ⊂ RM , I define for each s¯,
Bs¯(K0, (K1, . . . ,KS)) = {z¯ ∈ K0 : ∃zs ∈ Ks, s = 1, ..., S such that h(s¯, z¯, z1, . . . , zS) = 0,
g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0}.
Very roughly speaking in the subsequent analysis this operator will play a role similar
to the role of the Bellman operator in dynamic programming. The main difference is that
it is defined on sets and not on functions.
2.2 Robust -equilibria
Given any  ≥ 0, define an -equilibrium set to be a set Z = Z1 × . . . × ZS ⊂ RMS , such
that for all s¯ ∈ S and all z¯ ∈ Zs¯, g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0 and there exist (z1, . . . , zS) ∈ Z such that
‖h(s¯, z¯, z1, . . . , zS)‖ ≤ .
The following is an abstract definition of a robust -equilibrium set.
Definition 2 An -equilibrium set Z ⊂ RMS is robust if it is closed and bounded and if for
all s¯ ∈ S,
Bs¯(RM , (Z1, . . . ,ZS)) ⊂ Zs¯.
The definition requires that for all endogenous variables in the -equilibrium set which
could realize in the subsequent period, all variables in the current period that are consistent
with equilibrium must also lie in the set. I present a more intuitive economic interpretation
of the concept below after characterizing robust -equilibrium in terms of exact equilibrium.
The following lemma provides the theoretical foundation for this.
Lemma 1 Suppose that there are (non-empty) closed and bounded set (K01 , ...,K
0
S) such that
if one defines recursively, for each s¯,
Kis¯ = Bs¯(K
0
s¯ , (K
i−1
1 , . . . ,K
i−1
S ))
each Kis is non-empty and closed. Then there exists an equilibrium set with Zs ⊂ K0s for all
s = 1, ..., S
Although the lemma follows directly from Duffie et al (1994) I give the proof for com-
pleteness - the proof also helps to understand the subsequent analysis.
Proof of the Lemma. The main step of the proof consists in showing, by induction,
that Kis ⊂ Ki−1s for all i and all s. By definition K1s ⊂ K0s for all s. To show that if
Kis ⊂ Ki−1s , it must be that also Ki+1s ⊂ Kis, observe that if for a given s¯, z¯, there exist
zs ∈ Kis, s = 1, ..., S such that h(s¯, z¯, z1, ..., zS) = 0, g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0 then, since Kis ⊂ Ki−1s ,
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there must also exist zs ∈ Ki−1s , s = 1, . . . , S satisfying this property, and hence z¯ must lie
in Kis¯. Since the intersection of nested closed non-empty sets is non-empty, one can now
define for each s ∈ S, Zs = ∩∞i=0Kis. Clearly the collection of sets (Z1, . . . ,ZS) satisfy the
conditions of an equilibrium set. 
The lemma states that if one has candidate equilibrium sets K0 and one can somehow
prove that the recursively defined Ki are non-empty for all i, then one can infer that each
K0s in fact contains an equilibrium set Zs. If one takes K0 to a robust  equilibrium set, in
order to apply the lemma one still somehow needs to verify that each Ki is non-empty.
It is useful to do this via showing existence of truncated equilibria.
Definition 3 Given arbitrary sets (Z1, ..., ZS), Zs ⊂ RM , define a T -truncated equilibrium
with terminal condition (Z1, ..., ZS) as a finite horizon process (z(st))t≤T such that for each st,
t ≤ T − 1, the equilibrium conditions (2) hold and such that z(sT ) ∈ ZsT for all terminal sT .
The concept is closely related to the standard definition of equilibrium in truncated
economies. The only difference is that at the final period, T , agents face prices, consump-
tions and investments prescribed by Z and not as in the standard concept, zero asset prices
and no new trade. Showing existence of a T-truncated equilibrium with terminal condi-
tion turns out to be not much harder than showing existence of equilibria for truncated
economies (which is part of standard existence proofs in these models). I illustrate this
with an example below.
If for an arbitrary -equilibrium set Z, there exists a truncated equilibrium with termi-
nal condition Z for all T , it is not guaranteed that the set contains an exact equilibrium
since it is not guaranteed that the truncated equilibria take values in Z. However, if the
-equilibrium set is robust, it is clear by the definition that the truncated equilibria (if they
exist) must take values in the set. One can apply Lemma 1 and ensure that there must be
an exact equilibrium set contained in the -equilibrium set. The following theorem states
this formally.
Theorem 1 Suppose Z constitutes a robust  -equilibrium and that for each T there exists a
T -truncated equilibrium with terminal condition Z. Then there exists an exact equilibrium set
Z with Zs ⊂ Zs for each s ∈ S.
While the definition of robust -equilibrium makes no mention of an exact equilibrium
this theorem allows for the following interpretation of robust -equilibrium in terms of exact
equilibrium.
One typically hopes that competitive equilibria in infinite horizon models are good
approximations to equilibria in models with large finite horizons and that these equilibria
converge to the infinite equilibrium. In fact one hopes that changes in exogenous variables
in the far future have negligible effect on endogenous variables today. If the economy is
regular, small perturbations in endowments and other exogenous variables lead to small
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perturbations in endogenous variables, i.e. the -equilibrium can be interpreted as an exact
equilibrium of a perturbed economy (see Kubler and Schmedders (2005)). Robustness
requires that no matter how exogenous variables in the future are (locally) perturbed the
effect on endogenous variables today must be no larger than the effect on endogenous
variables at the date of the perturbation.
Dynamic models with a single agent can typically be solved using dynamic programming
and it is a simple application of the contraction mapping theorem to show that equilibria
exist, are unique and -equilibria are robust in our sense. In models with heterogeneous
agents, little is known about the structure of exact equilibria and nothing is known about
uniqueness. However, existing computational techniques often use iterative schemes to ob-
tain approximate solutions to the dynamic models with heterogeneous agents which are
very similar to value-function iteration (see e.g. Krueger and Kubler (2004) and the ref-
erences therein). These schemes will generally not converge the equilibrium conditions do
not behave locally as a contraction mapping. The concept of robust -equilibrium can be
viewed as a (local) version of a weak contraction mapping in models with heterogeneous
agents.
2.3 Verification and existence of robust -equilibria
The main advantage of the concept is that semi-algebraic robust -equilibria exist under
reasonable assumptions on the fundamentals and that (at least in principle) one can always
check numerically whether a given semi-algebraic set constitutes a robust -equilibrium.
This follows from the so-called Tarski-Seidenberg principle and the quantifier elimination
algorithm (see e.g. Bochnak et al. (1998, Chapter 5) for the Tarski-Seidenberg principle and
Basu et al. (2003) for computational issues).
The following lemma is a simple consequence of the Tarski-Seidenberg principle but
suffices for the purposes of this section.
Lemma 2 Given any semi-algebraic sets X,Y, Z, with (x0, x1) ∈ X ⊂ Rl0 ×Rl1 , Y ⊂ Rl0 and
Z ⊂ Rl1 define
Φ = {x0 ∈ Y | ∃ x1 ∈ Z [(x0, x1) ∈ X]}.
The set Φ is itself a semi-algebraic set and can be written as the finite union of basic semi-
algebraic sets of the form
{x ∈ Rn : f1(x) = · · · = fl(x) = 0, g1(x) > 0, . . . , gm(x) > 0} ,
where f1, . . . , fl, g1, . . . , gm ∈ R[x].
Algorithmic quantifier elimination can be used to compute the describing polynomial
functions f and g.
The lemma immediately implies that if Z0, . . . , ZS are semi-algebraic, so must beBs(Z0, (Z1, . . . , ZS)).
In particular if Z is a semi-algebraic set and a candidate robust -equilibrium set, the set
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Bs(RM , (Z1, ...,ZS)) is semi-algebraic and Z is robust if
Bs(RM , (Z1, ...,ZS)) ⊂ Zs for all s ∈ S.
Algorithmic quantifier elimination can be used to decide whether this set-inclusion holds,
i.e. to decide for a given ( semi-algebraic) -equilibrium set Z and for each s¯ ∈ S if there
is a z ∈ Bs¯(RM , (Z1, . . . ,ZS)) which is not in Zs¯.
There is an algorithm that decides for a given semi-algebraic set of -equilibria if it is
a robust -equilibrium set2. If it is, it must contain an exact equilibrium. This raises the
question if one should expect robust -equilibrium sets to exist and to be semi-algebraic.
2.3.1 Existence of robust -equilibrium
Lemma 1 provides an algorithm to construct robust  equilibria and the Tarski-Seidenberg
principle implies that these are semi-algebraic. Suppose from the economic model one can
find a priori bounds on all endogenous equilibrium variables (the example below shows this
is usually not very difficult, these bound typically come from non-negativity constraints
in consumption, market-clearing etc.) Let K0 satisfy these bounds and without loss of
generality, impose the bounds in the equilibrium inequality g(.) ≥ 0.
It is clear that if K0 is semi-algebraic the constructed Kis are semi-algebraic for all
i = 1, ... and each s. Fixing an  > 0 there must now exist a sufficiently large i such that
Ki actually constitutes an -equilibrium set. By boundedness of K0, for each δ > 0 there
must be an i such that for all s, if z ∈ Kis there must be a z˜ ∈ Ki+1s with ‖z − z˜‖ < δ.
For each  there must be a δ so that if h(s¯, z˜, z1, . . . , zS) = 0 then ‖h(s¯, z, z1, . . . , zS)‖ ≤ 
whenever ‖z − z˜‖ < δ.
The construction also implies that Ki is robust - if there existed some s¯, z¯ with z¯ ∈
Bs¯(RM , (Ki1, . . . ,KiS)) but z¯ /∈ Kis¯, clearly by Lemma 1, we must have z¯ /∈ K0s¯ . But this is
impossible because the inequality g(.) ≥ 0 imposes z¯ ∈ K0s¯ by constructions.
Unfortunately, so far the analysis did not put enough structure on the equilibrium to
ensure that the -equilibrium set is actually small and Theorem 1 has some content. More
structure is also needed to develop efficient algorithms for verifying robustness of a candidate
robust -equilibrium set.
3 A recursive formulation
So far, the analysis was done for abstract () equilibrium sets. However, while it is easy
to compute one ‘recursive’ approximate equilibrium, researchers typically do not explicitly
compute entire sets of equilibria. In this Section, I use the theoretical results above to show
that it is possible to verify that a recursive -equilibrium is close to an exact (not necessarily
recursive) competitive equilibrium.
2It is well known that quantifier elimination is hopelessly inefficient. I introduce more a more tractable
method for this below.
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For this, I need to impose a bit more structure on the abstract economy and define
a recursive -equilibrium. I decompose the equilibrium set and write it as the graph of a
‘policy-correspondence’. I write the vector of endogenous variables as z = (θ−, η), with θ−
being the ‘endogenous state’. The relevant endogenous state space Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘS) with
each Θs ⊂ RD depends on the underlying model and is determined by the payoff-relevant
pre-determined endogenous variables; that is, by variables sufficient for the optimization of
individuals at every date-event, given the prices. If Θ is the ‘endogenous state space’ there
must exist set-valued functions ρs : Θs ⇒ RM−D such each Zs = graph(ρs) for all s ∈ S.
The function h(.) typically uniquely determines θ−s for each shock s, as a function of z¯.
In the simplest example, the beginning-of-period portfolio holding is the endogenous state
and this is equal to last period’s choices across agents. I illustrate this point with a slightly
more complicated example in the next section.
The value of the state variables s0 ∈ S,θ−(0) ∈ Θs0 in period 0 is called ‘initial condition’
and is part of the description of the economy. It will often be useful to make this explicit.
In particular I often want to require that an equilibrium set describes a family of equilibria
arising from different initial conditions in a set of θ−(0) that contains an open set. Through
this requirement, the state-space Θ is partly specified exogenously, but it is of course en-
dogenous in the sense it must contain all realizations of θ− that occur in equilibrium. In
some models with exogenous constraints on trades, Θ can be takes as exogenous since the
realizations of θ− are predetermined through these restrictions. This applies for example
in models with asset markets and short-sale constraints on these assets. For the purpose
of this paper it will be useful to assume that there are sufficient constraints on trades that
ensure that in fact Θ is specified exogenously. I will give an example below where this is
not the case and show that it is without loss of generality to assume that in fact agents face
trading constraints that are never binding in equilibrium.
A recursive -equilibrium consists of sets Θˆs, and functions ρˆs : Θˆs → RM−D, s ∈ S
such that if Zs = graph(ρˆs) for all s ∈ S, then Z constitutes an -equilibrium set. Note
that the comment made about the exogeneity of Θ also applies to Θˆ. Again I will assume
that Θˆ is given through the description of the economy and that therefore Θs = Θˆs for all
s ∈ S.
From now I will also assume that ρˆs is a continuous semi-algebraic function for all s ∈ S.
It is easy to see that ρˆs itself, since it is a function, will never describe a robust -
equilibrium set (unless it is an exact equilibrium). The first step is therefore to create a
function strip around ρˆ that describes an entire set of -equilibria.
3.1 Robust -equilibrium sets
For a given approximate recursive equilibrium (Θˆs, ρˆs)s∈S and fixed δ > 0, I take as a
candidate  -equilibrium set
Zs = {(θ−, η) : θ− ∈ Θˆs, ‖η − ρˆs(θ−)‖ ≤ δ}, s ∈ S.
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Note that the exact relation between δ and  in this definition is not important for what
follows. What is important is that one would expect that if for sufficiently small δ, Z
contains an exact competitive equilibrium, Z should also be a robust -equilibrium set.
Given the analysis above,, in order to verify robustness, one now needs to verify that
for all s ∈ S,
Bs(RM , (Z1, . . . ,ZS)) ⊂ Zs.
However, this neglects the fact that one would like the recursive -equilibrium to be close to
an exact equilibrium for all θ− ∈ Θˆs, s ∈ S. But since I assumed that Θ is given exogenously
through constraints on trades, it is without loss of generality to impose that the inequalities
h(.) ≥ 0 ensure that θ−s always realize in Θs. Therefore the definition of robust equilibrium
is now equivalent to the following, perhaps more intuitive concept. Define for each s ∈ S,
Ys = {z = (θ−, η) ∈ RM : θ− ∈ Θˆs} and require for Z that for each s ∈ S,
Bs(Ys, (Z1, . . . ,ZS)) ⊂ Zs. (3)
In other words, if endogenous variables next period lie within some δ of ρˆ all endogenous
variables this period must also lie within δ of ρˆ. Of course, Theorem 1 now needs to be
modified and one needs to require that there exist truncated equilibria that do not only
satisfy the terminal condition but that also satisfy that θ−(st) ∈ Θˆst for all st. In the
recursive framework this can be formulated as ’emptyness of an error set’. I define the error
set for each shock s¯ ∈ S as follows.
Eδs¯ (ρˆ) = { (, θ¯−, η¯, θ−1, . . . θ−S) :
θ¯− ∈ Θˆs¯, θ−s ∈ Θˆs, s ∈ S
h(s¯, (θ¯−, η¯), (θ−1, ρˆ1(θ−1) + 1), . . . , (θ−S , ρˆS(θ−S) + S)) = 0
g(s¯, θ¯−, η¯) ≥ 0
‖s‖ < δ, s ∈ S
‖ρˆs¯(θ¯−)− η¯‖ > δ}
This set contains all endogenous variables today, (θ¯−, η¯), for which η¯ is not within δ of
ρˆ(θ¯−), despite the fact that all endogenous variables next period are with δ of ρˆ. It is easy
to see that emptyness of ρˆ is equivalent to (3). In Section 3.2 below I introduce efficient
computational techniques that can be used to establish emptyness of E , if h and g and ρˆ
are polynomial functions.
If the error set is empty, Z is a robust -equilibrium set and if for any T there exists
a T−truncated equilibrium one can apply Theorem 1 and establish that there is a com-
petitive equilibrium within δ of the approximate recursive equilibrium ρˆ. Note that for
this argument to go through one needs to ensure that the realizations of the state in each
truncated equilibrium satisfy θ(st) ∈ Θˆst for all st. However, I assumed that this is ensured
through constraints on trades and that therefore ensured by the inequalities g(s, z) ≥ 0.
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The following theorem states this fact formally and provides the theoretical foundation for
self-validating computation.
Theorem 2 Suppose for given continuous ρˆs, s ∈ S, for any T and any initial condition s0,
Θˆs0 , there exists a T -truncated equilibrium with terminal condition graph(ρˆ). If for each s ∈ S
the error-set Eδs is empty, there must exist a competitive equilibrium, Z, with Zs = graph(ρs),
s ∈ S, such that
sup
s∈S,θ−∈Θs,η∈ρs(θ−)
‖ρˆs(θ−)− η‖ < δ.
The theorem assumes that constraints on trades ensure that Θˆ is given exogenously
and that in any equilibrium θ(st) ∈ Θˆst for all st. Without this assumption, Θˆ needs to
be computed together with ρˆ. The theorem remains valid if one can show that for the
candidate robust  equilibrium set all endogenous variables that determine the state next
period are such that this state lies in Θˆ. In other words, for a given Θˆ, one can carry
out the analysis for a modified economy where agents’ choices are restricted to ensure that
the state realizes in Θˆ and then verify afterwards that the additional restrictions on trades
never bind in equilibrium.
The requirement in the theorem is stronger than needed with regard to two important
aspects. First, in many application, the condition will simply fail because different en-
dogenous variables are scaled differently. If consumption in one state next period changes
by some epsilon, portfolio holdings this period might change dramatically simply because
payoffs are small or close to co-linear across assets. It is therefore useful to introduce dif-
ferent bounds for different variables. Furthermore in most applications, one needs to know
only consumption (and perhaps prices) next period to determine endogenous variables this
period. Therefore, it is useful to weaken the requirement in Theorem 2 and to divide the
variables as follows η = (η1, η2) where η1 = (η1, . . . , ηl) contains a minimal set of endoge-
nous variables that one needs to know for next period in order to determine endogenous
variables this period (that is individuals’ consumption and perhaps prices) and where η2
contains all those variables which only enter in the current period (in particular portfo-
lios). Let ρˆη1(., s) = (ρˆη1 , . . . , ρˆηl) denote the approximate policy-correspondence for these
endogenous variables. The error set now becomes
E(δ1,...,δl)s¯ (ρˆ) = { ((1s, . . . , ls)Ss=1, θ¯−, η¯, θ−1, . . . θ−S) :
θ¯− ∈ Θˆs¯, θ−s ∈ Θˆs, s ∈ S
h(s¯, (θ¯−, η¯), (θ−1, ρˆη1(θ−1, 1) + 1), . . . , (θ−S , ρˆη1(θ−S , S) + S)) = 0
g(s¯, θ¯−, η¯) ≥ 0
‖is‖ < δi, s ∈ S, i = 1, ..., l
‖ρˆηi(θ¯−, s¯)− η¯i‖ > δi, for some i = 1, . . . , l}
(4)
If there exist (δ1, . . . , δl) with E(δ1,...,δl)s (ρˆ) empty for all s, the -equilibrium set
Zs = {(θ−, η) : θ− ∈ Θˆs, ‖ηi − ρˆηi(θ−, s)‖ ≤ δi}, i = 1, . . . , l, s ∈ S,
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must be robust. If there exist T -truncated equilibria for all T , with the state always realizing
in Θˆ then there must exit an exact equilibrium with ρη1 lying within δmax = maxi=1...l δi of
ρˆη1 .
3.2 Computation of the error set
So far, nothing shows that it is computationally feasible to actually verify whether E is
empty. As mentioned above, in principle, one can use quantifier elimination to do so.
Unfortunately, it turns out that quantifier elimination is not feasible for even the smallest
problems. In practice, one needs much more efficient methods to tackle this problem. I will
use polynomial optimization (see Laurent (2008) for an overview).
The condition of Theorem 2 can be verified by solving the following constrained opti-
mization problem for each s ∈ S,
maxθ−∈Θˆs,,η ‖η − ρˆ(θ−)‖ s.t. ‖‖ ≤ δ
h (s, θ−, η, (θ−1, ρˆ1(θ−1) + 1), . . . , (θ−S , ρˆS(θ−S) + S)) = 0
g(s, θ−, η) ≥ 0
(5)
I assume that h,g and ρˆ are continuous semi-algebraic functions and that Θˆs are closed
semi-algebraic sets. It follows from Proposition 2.1.8. of Bochnak et al. (1998) that there
exist polynomials pi : A→ Rk and qi : A→ Rl, i = 1, ...,m, such that
h (s, θ−, η, (θ−1, ρˆ1(θ−1) + 1), . . . , (θ−S , ρˆS(θ−S) + S)) = 0, g(s, θ−, η) ≥ 0
if and only if for some i = 1, ...,m,
pi (s, θ−, η, (θ−1, ρˆ1(θ−1) + 1), . . . , (θ−S , ρˆS(θ−S) + S)) = 0, qi(s, θ−, η) ≥ 0.
Furthermore there exist polynomials ξi and ζi such that ρˆ(θ−) = η ⇔ ξi(θ, η) = 0, ζi(θ, η) ≥
0 for some i. Therefore one can solve the maximization problem (5) by solving a series of
polynomial optimization problems.
To simplify notation I will assume from now on that h, g and ρˆ are already polynomial
functions. It will be the case in all but one of the applications below, that the equilibrium
conditions can directly be rewritten as polynomial functions and that ρˆ is polynomial to
start with. In one application, it is important to take ρˆ to be piecewise polynomial. This
is of course a very simple case of a semi-algebraic function and the above analysis applies
trivially.
In principle, under the assumption that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and
have finitely many isolated solutions, algorithms designed to find all solutions to polynomial
equations (see Sturmfels (2002) for an overview) can be used to find all critical points and
by comparing them, one can find the solution to the system. However, this ‘brute force’
approach is extremely inefficient. For relatively small models where h consists of around 4-5
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equations of low degree, one can use computer-algebra systems to find the so-called Gro¨bner
basis for h(.). This is an equivalent system of polynomials which has a simple triangular
structure and solving the system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions using the Gro¨bner basis often
turns out to be much simpler. This approach has the advantage that one does not need to
worry about rounding errors and actually formally proves that an approximate equilibrium
is close to an exact equilibrium. Unfortunately, it is only feasible for small models and if ρˆ
itself is of very low degree.
For larger problems, it turns out to be advantageous to use semi-definite programming
and so called sum-of-squares relaxation to solve the polynomial optimization problem. In
the following I briefly explain the basic idea of the method.
3.2.1 Sum-of-squares relaxations
In the last decade big advances have been made in polynomial optimization - see Laurent
(2008) for an overview. The basic idea, (which is nicely explained in detail in e.g. Parrilo
(2003)), is as follows.
A polynomial p ∈ R[x] is said to be a sum of squares (of polynomials) if it can be written
as
p =
m∑
j=1
u2j for some uj ∈ R[x].
Clearly, if for a polynomial p, there exists a number γ, such that p− γ is a sum of squares,
then γ is a lower bound for p(x) for any x.
If the degree of p is d, in order for it to be a sum of squares, there have to exist uj which
are of degree d/2. The main insight is now that one can use semi-definite programming to
search over all polynomials of degree d/2 to establish that p is the sum of squares. The
polynomial p can be written as a quadratic form of all the monomials of degree less than or
equal to d, i.e. let z =
[
1, x1, x2, ..., xn, x21, x1x2, ..., x
d
n
]
be the vector of all such monomials.
Then there must exist a positive-definite matrix Q with
p(x) = zTQz.
This matrix can be found using semi-definite programming (see Parrilo (2003) for details).
Following the same idea, but slightly more complicated, now consider the constrained
optimization problem
min f(x) s.t
g1(x) = . . . = gm(x) = 0, h1(x) ≥ 0, . . . , hl(x) ≥ 0.
If there exist a number γ, arbitrary polynomials q1, ..., qm ∈ R[x] and sum-of-squares poly-
nomials r1, ..., rl ∈ R[x] such that
p := f − γ −
m∑
i=1
giqi −
l∑
i=1
hiri (6)
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is a sum-of-squares, then clearly f(x) ≥ γ for all x satisfying g(x) = 0, h(x) ≥ 0. So again, γ
is a lower bound for the minimization problem. As before, given a candidate p, semi-definite
programming can be used to efficiently check if p is a sum-of-squares.
It is quite complicated to derive conditions on g and h that ensure that the converse
holds, i.e. if γ solves the minimization problem, one can achieve the sum-of-square represen-
tation. The Positivstellensa¨tze by Schmu¨dgen and by Putinar (see Laurent (2008, Theorem
3.16)) provide an answer. Basically, one needs to impose a condition a bit stronger than
compactness of the constrained set – it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this
further.
More important for this paper is the fact that it is not possible to find good bounds
on the degree of q and r and therefore on the degree of p in equation (6). While one can
still use semi-definite programming to determine for which γ the term in the equation can
be written as a sum of squares, one has no a priori-bound on the degree and therefore
has to experiment with different values. Fixing the maximal degree of the polynomial p,
semi-definite programming can be used to determine efficiently if polynomials q and r of
appropriate degree exist. Waki et al. (2006) provide a way to exploit sparseness in the
polynomial problem so that the method is applicable to relatively large problems. They
report solving (sparse) problems with several hundred variables.
In Section 4 below, I use a matlab implementation by the authors called SparsePOP,
described in Waki et al. (2008) to solve the relatively small problems that arise from the
applications. The package produces a lower bound for the problem, γ, from the solution
of the semi-definite program, as well as an approximate solution (the minimizer) to the
polynomial problem. If these values coincide a true minimum has been found. If γ is
smaller than the value of f at the approximate solution, γ is still a lower bound for the
problem but neither γ nor the value of f might be the true minimum.
It is important to understand that one cannot always guarantee that the algorithm finds
the global minimum. There are essentially two reasons for this. First, it turns out that
solving the resulting semi-definite program is a difficult numerical problem and the solver
might fail to find a solution (see Waki et al. (2006) for a extensive discussion of this problem
and some possible remedies). More importantly, to use SparsePOP one needs to specify the
degree of relaxation (the parameter ’param.relaxOrder’ ), which is a bound on d/2 where
d is the degree of the polynomial p in Equation (6). As explained above, one cannot say
a priori how large this should be. In the examples below I try the values 3, 4, and for the
deterministic example the values 5 and 6. Large values generally lead to severe numerical
problems. Obviously, even if there exist γ and polynomials r and u such that p can be
written as the sum of squares, it is not guaranteed that it will be of degree 8 or less. One
should therefore expect the algorithm to fail in some cases.
However, the output of the algorithm is always a lower bound on the true value of the
minimization problem. For my purposes, it is irrelevant what the true value of the problem
is. In order to determine if the error set E is empty for a given δ one actually does not have
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to solve the maximization problem (5). It suffices, that that δ provides an upper bound3
for the problem. So if the software package finds a γ < δ for which the problem can be
written as a sum-of-squares, existence of a robust equilibrium within δ of the candidate
equilibrium is proven. If the software package does not find such a γ, nothing can be said
about emptyness of the error-set.
3.2.2 Identifying regions without equilibria
Finally the output of the algorithm can be used to make statements about all competitive
that are close to ρˆ. If for a given δ > 0, the algorithm solves the maximization problem
and finds a value of  < δ as an upper bound to the problem, one can infer that the set
{(θ−, η) : θ− ∈ Θˆs,  ≤ ‖η − ρˆs(θ−)‖ ≤ δ} does not contain any equilibrium values. Of
course, for relatively large δ, it will not be true that the maximization problem has a solution
less than δ. However, in the examples below, I illustrate that solving the maximization
problem repeatedly for different values of δ can lead to situations where on can make
statements about all equilibria out of a large set.
4 Example: Stochastic overlapping generations
In this section, I illustrate the method using a simple stochastic olg economy. Agents live
for three periods, there is a single good, no production, a single agent per generation and a
Markov chain determines endowments over the life cycle. I assume that financial markets
are complete and consider both cases with and without trading constraint. The main
purpose of this section is to illustrate the theoretical results above. Clearly there a trade-off
between the model and notation being extremely simple and the model being ’interesting’,
i.e. somewhat realistic or similar to models used in other applications. While focusing on
three period lives certainly makes the model very simple, similar models have been used in
applications (see e.g. Constantinides et al. (2002)) and for examples of indeterminacy of
competitive equilibrium (see Kehoe and Levine (1990)).
At each date-event a single individual commences his economic life; he lives for 3 periods.
An individual is identified by the date event of his birth, σ = (st). The age of an individual
is a = 0, . . . , 2; he consumes and has endowments at all nodes st+a  st, a = 0, 1, 2. An
agent’s individual endowments are a function of the shock and his age alone, i.e. for all
a = 0, . . . , 2, es
t
(st+a) = ea(st+a) for some function ea : S → R+.
The agent has an intertemporal time-separable expected utility function.
Uσ(c) =
2∑
a=0
∑
st+aσ
pi(st+a|σ)ua
(
c(st+a), st+a
)
3While I describe the abstract problem using minimization, the emptyness of the error-set is determined
using maximization.
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The Bernoulli utility u depends on the age and the current shock alone.
At each st, there are S Arrow-securities in zero net supply available for trade. Asset s
pays one unit at next period node st+1 if and only if the realized shock is s, i.e. st+1 = s.
Prices of assets are q(st) ∈ RS and agent σ’s portfolio is φσ(st) ∈ RS . Agents might face
a borrowing constraint of the form A(q(st))φσ(st) ≥ b, where A(q) is a K × S matrix that
might depend on the current price and b ∈ Rk. Below I will compute an equilibrium for the
case A(q) = qT , in order to apply Theorem 1, one needs to consider a modified economy
with 2S constraints which imply A = (IS×S IS×S).
At the root node, s0, there are individuals of all ages s−1, . . . , s−2 with initial wealth
θs
−a
(s−1). These determine the ‘initial condition’ of the economy.
It will turn out to be useful to write ca(st) and φa(st) to denote consumption and
portfolios of the agent born at st−a.
A competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices and choices of individuals (q(st), (φa(st), ca(st))a=0,1,2)st∈Σ
such that markets clear and agents optimize, i.e. for all nodes st ∈ Σ we have
• Market clearing:
2∑
a=0
φa(st) = 0
• For each st,individual σ = st maximizes utility:
(cσ, φσ) ∈ arg max
c≥0,φ
Uσ(c) s.t.
c(st)− e0(st) + q(st) · φ(st) ≤ 0, A(q(st))φ(st) ≥ b
c(st+1)− e1(st+1) + q(st+1) · φ(st+1)− φst+1(st) ≤ 0, A(q(st+1))φ(st+1) ≥ b
c(st+2)− e2(st+2)− φst+2(st+1) ≤ 0
for all st+1  σ and all st+2  st+1
Optimality conditions for initially alive agents, s−1 and s−2 are analogous.
4.1 Equilibrium equations and policy correspondences
In order to write the equilibrium equations, it turns out to be useful to first define the
endogenous state space as follows. In each period, agents cash-at-hand consists of of the
payoff of the portfolio purchased in the previous period. The ’state of the economy’ then
consists of the exogenous shock s ∈ S as well as cash-at-hand of the current middle-aged and
the current old. By market clearing, it will turn out to be sufficient to focus on cash-at-hand
of the middle aged, but for this section, it is useful to make this explicit.
Define c = (c0, c1, c2) to be consumption across agents alive in the current period and
φ = (φ0, φ1) to be new portfolio choices and κ = (κ0, κ1)R2K+ be the multipliers associated
with the borrowing constraint, as well as (θ1−, θ2−) to be beginning of period wealth of the
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middle aged and the old. Let z = (θ−, q, c, φ, κ) denote the vector of endogenous variables
in a given period.
It is well known that under the assumption that Uh is strictly increasing, strictly quasi-
concave and satisfies an Inada-condition, the first order conditions are necessary and suffi-
cient for agent optimality. The equilibrium equations consist of these first order conditions,
budget equations, market-clearing and the equations that determine cash-at-hand in the
next period, given choices today.
h(s, z, z1, ..., zS) =

c0 − e0(s) + q · φ0
c1 − e1(s) + q · φ1 − θ1−
c2 − e2(s)− θ2−
−qs′u′0(c0, s) + pi(s′|s)u′1(c1s′ , s′) + κ0 ·As(q)
−qs′u′1(c1, s) + pi(s′|s)u′2(c2s′ , s′) + κ1 ·As(q)
κij(A(q)φ
a − b)j , a = 0, 1, j = 1, . . . ,K
φ0 + φ1
θ1−s − φ0s, θ2−s + θ1−s, for all s ∈ S
and
g(s, θ−, q, c, φ, κ) =

A(q)φa − b, a = 0, 1
κa, a = 0, 1
ca, a = 0, 1, 2
Evidently, except in the special case where u′a are polynomial, h(.) is not a polynomial
function as written here. However, if u′ is semi-algebraic, h can always be rewritten as a
polynomial function, with additional inequalities in g. In Section 4 below I write h as a
polynomial for the case where u(.) exhibits constant relative risk-aversion.
An equilibrium set can be characterized by suitable Θs ⊂ R, s ∈ S, and maps ρs : Θs ⇒
RJ × R3+ × R2J × R2+, for all s ∈ S such that s¯ ∈ S, all θ¯− ∈ Θs¯, η¯ = (q¯, c¯, φ¯, κ¯) ∈ ρs¯(θ¯−)
with g(s¯, z¯) ≥ 0, there exist z1 = (θ−1, η1), . . . , zS = (θ−S , ηS), with ηs ∈ ρs(θ−s) such that
h
(
s¯, (θ¯−, q¯, c¯, φ¯, κ¯), z1, . . . , zS
)
= 0 and g(s¯, θ¯−, q¯, c¯, φ¯, κ¯) ≥ 0.
Note that if K = 0 and there are no constraints on trades, and the endogenous state
space Θs is completely endogenous. Therefore, the previous analysis has to be slightly
modified. One can view a recursive -equilibrium of an economy without constraints that is
given by ρs : Θˆs → RM−D, with Θˆs semi-algebraic for all s = 1, . . . , S, as an -equilibrium
of an economy where each agent faces the constraint φs ∈ Θˆs, but the constraint is simply
never binding. Through the error set, one then needs to verify that this -equilibrium is
close to an exact equilibrium with the same constraints in which this constraints are also
never binding. In practice I therefore check if a δ-strip around the computed  equilibrium
is a robust -equilibrium set for the economy with constraints and then show that in the
exact equilibrium these constraints never bind.
18
As explained in the introduction, it is not difficult to show that competitive equilibrium
and policy-correspondences exist. There are no known conditions that give existence of
a continuous policy-function. Citanna and Siconolfi (2008) prove generic existence of a
single-valued correspondence. In order to apply the main result of the paper, Theorem 2,
one first needs to establish existence of truncated equilibria with terminal conditions. To
prove existence of competitive equilibria in these models, on typically first proves that an
equilibrium exists for all finitely truncated economies and then take the limit. The result I
need for Theorem 2 is very similar to this.
4.1.1 Existence of truncated equilibrium
Let ρˆq denote the approximate pricing function and ρˆφ the approximate policy function of
the middle aged. Let Θˆs = [as, bs] ⊂ R be a closed interval for each s. Let c ≥ 0 denote
a lower bound of an agents’ consumption in any equilibrium. In the case where u(.) is
continuous on R+ this is zero, for cases where u(c) → −∞ as c → 0, this is some positive
number determined by the fact that endowments are strictly positive and agents are finitely
lived.
To simplify the argument, I assume that as > −e1s for all s. When agents are three
period lived this assumption is almost always sensible. It is true that one can certainly
construct economies where in equilibrium the middle-aged holds beginning-of-period debt
that exceeds his individual endowments, but then one can also bound prices a priori so that
that positive consumption is guaranteed even for as ≤ −e1s.
As mentioned above, existence of a truncated equilibrium is shown for a slightly modified
economy where all agents face additional trading constraints of the form
φs ≥ as, φs ≤ bs, s ∈ S.
In this setup, it is relatively straightforward to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose ρˆ is continuous and that for any s ∈ S and any θ− ∈ Θˆs, e1(s) + θ−s −
ρˆq(θ−, s) · ρˆφ(θ−, s) > c. Then for all initial conditions s0, θ−(s0) ∈ Θˆs0 and for any T , there
exists a T -truncated competitive equilibrium with terminal condition ρˆ.
Although the proof of the lemma is a standard application of Kakutani’s theorem, I
present an outline. The only difficulty lies in making assumptions that ensure that agents’
budget sets are non-empty.
Fix initial conditions s0, θ−(s0) ∈ Θˆs0 . Each agent in the T horizon economy who is
not active at T takes prices a given and a standard argument shows that his best response
is continuous in prices. The budget-set of the middle-aged at t = 0 is non-empty because
as > −e1s. At each node st, t < T , there is a price player that takes choices at the node as
given and solves
max
(p,q)∈∆J
p(c0(st) + c1(st) + c2(st)) + q · (φ0(st) + φ1(st)).
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His choices are upper-hemi continuous and convex valued in choices of all agents. All
agents born at node sT−1, take as given q¯(sT ) and φ¯(sT ), as well as prices at sT−2 and as
sT−1. Define their consumption at T to be the maximum of e1s + θ−s − q¯(sT ) · ρ¯(sT ) and
c. It is standard to show that their best responses are upper-hemi-continuous non-empty
and convex valued. Finally, q¯(sT ) and φ¯(sT ) are determined by the continuous function ρˆ
depending on θ0(sT−2) subject to the constraint. Kakutani’s theorem ensures the existence
of a fixed point of the product of the best-responses – this is a T-truncated equilibrium
according to the above definition.
4.2 Computation, endowments and preferences
As explained in the introduction, this is paper is not about how to compute approximate
equilibrium. For the simple model in this section, there are several reliable methods to do
so. I use the time-iteration algorithm which is explained in detail in Kubler and Krueger
(2004) for a model with overlapping generations and production. I first consider the case
without borrowing constraints, i.e. K = 0. Section 4.5 below discusses the case of binding
constraints. For the unconstrained case, I approximate the functions ρˆq and ρˆφ by polyno-
mials of degree 5 in the computations. I then show that robust equilibria can often be very
well approximated by lower degree polynomials. For the constrained case, I approximate ρˆ
by splines of order 3 (i.e. piece-wise cubic functions), using 100 pieces. I then show that a
piecewise linear function, consisting of only two pieces approximates the result extremely
well.
Throughout, I assume that for each a and s, ua(c, s) = −βas c1−σ, βas > 0, i.e. preferences
exhibit constant relative risk aversion with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of σ > 1.
Throughout, I take for each s ∈ S, Θs to be the smallest interval that contains the initial
condition and that is feasible in the sense that in the self-validated equilibrium, choices at all
nodes ensure that next period’s endogenous state is feasible, i.e. lies in the state-space. The
initial condition is part of the description of the economy. For simplicity I take θ(s−1) = 0.
Throughout this section, I examine how well the true consumption map ρc can be
approximated by cubic polynomials, or in the case of constraints by piecewise cubic polyno-
mials. It is clear that if one proves that the approximate consumption function ρˆc is close
to the consumption map of an exact equilibrium, one can deduce that computed prices and
portfolios are also close. There are two reasons to focus on the consumption function. First,
unlike investment or asset holdings, one can normalize the economy so that consumption is
never too far away from 1 and relative and absolute errors are of the same order of magni-
tude. Secondly, it will turn out to be striking how often consumption functions are actually
close to linear.
When verifying that ρˆ constitutes a δ-approximate equilibrium I take as given that for
all s, and all θ− ∈ Θs, ρˆc(θ−, s) > δ. I also take as given that Θˆ is chose in such a way that
for all s¯ ∈ S and all θ¯s ∈ Θˆs¯, ρˆφs(θ¯−, s¯) + δ ∈ Θˆs¯ and ρˆφs(θ¯−, s¯)− δ ∈ Θˆs¯, i.e. the additional
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constraints that need to be imposed for Theorem 1 are never binding in equilibrium.
4.3 Complete markets without constraints
In this Section, I assume that there are no constraints . For this simple case of complete
markets and no constraint, the polynomial optimization-problem (5) simplifies considerably.
Fix a sufficiently small constant ζ > 0. For each shock s ∈ S, I consider the following
two maximization problems.
max
(1,...,S),θ−,q,φ
±(e1(s) + θ− + q · φ− ρˆc(θ−, s)) s.t.
e1(s) + θ− + q · φ ≥ ζ, e0(s)− q · φ ≥ ζ
e0(s′) + e1(s′) + e2(s′)− ζ ≥ e2(s′)− d(s′) · φ ≥ ζ, for all s′ ∈ S
qj ≥ ζ, j = 1, . . . , J
−δ ≤ s′ ≤ δ, for all s′ ∈ S
−qs′(s′ + ρˆc1(φs′ , s′))σ + pi(s′|s)β1s′(e0(s)− q · φ)σ = 0, s′ = 1, 2
−qs′(e2(s′)− φs′)σ + pi(s′|s)β2s′(e1(s) + q · φ+ θ−)σ = 0, s′ = 1, 2,
(7)
where ± indicates that first the positive objective function is maximized and secondly the
negative objective function is maximized. This means that one has to solve two optimization
problems for each shock s. If for each s, the solution to the first problem is less than δ and
the solution to the second problem is greater than −δ, and none of the inequality constraints
involving ζ is binding, the error set as defined in Section 3 must be empty and ρˆ is within
δ of a robust equilibrium.
To illustrate the method it is useful to start with a simple deterministic example. The
example is from Kehoe and Levine (1990) who show that this economy has a continuum of
equilibria.
Example 1 Suppose there is no uncertainty and (e0, e1, e2) = (3, 12, 1), β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.25
and agents have coefficient of relative risk aversion of σ = 4.
As Kehoe Levine (1990) point out this economy has three (‘real’) steady states with
prices and bond-holdings given by q∗(1) = 0.1756, φ∗(1) = −5.772−, q∗(2) = 0.7925, φ∗(2) =
−3.732− and q∗(3) = 44.634, φ∗(3) = −0.183. They show that close to the middle state
state there must be a continuum of competitive equilibria.
On the other hand, one can use standard computational techniques to compute a set of
equilibria (corresponding to different initial conditions) which can be described extremely
well by a cubic function. Let Θˆ = [−4, 0] and ρˆc1(θ−) = 3.667+0.162θ−+0.004θ2−−0.0005θ3−.
For δ = 0.001 the resulting -equilibrium set can be verified to be robust. Using SparsePOP,
the solutions of the above maximization problem (7) are below 0.0009 (in absolute value)
in both cases - the error set must be empty. Since I established existence of truncated
equilibria, there must be an exact equilibrium set with consumption of the middle aged
within 0.001 of ρˆc1 . Moreover, the maximization problems can be solved for large δ. For
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up to δ = 2 the resulting optimal solution is always significantly less than δ. This shows
that not only ρˆ approximates one competitive equilibrium, all competitive equilibria with
consumption of the middle aged within 2 of ρˆ must in fact be within 0.001 of ρˆ. The
situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The solid line contains the exact equilibrium, and there
are no other exact equilibria anywhere between the two dotted lines. The middle steady
state, at θ∗− = −3.732 implies consumption of the middle aged of 6.31. One can see in
Figure 1 that this value is only slightly above the dotted line. In this sense the bounds
found by the method seem relatively tight.
Finally, one can find another equilibrium that corresponds to the third steady state. Let
Θˆ = [−6,−3],
ρˆc1(θ−) = 6.18− 0.7631θ− − 0.1644θ2− − 0.006θ3−.
For δ = 0.005, the resulting error set is empty. It turns out that up to δ = 0.1, one can
verify that all equilibria lie close to ρˆ - a much smaller neighborhood than for the previous
equilibrium. Figure 2 plots this equilibrium together with the ‘equilibrium-free’ set around
it.
Note that in Figure 1 the consumption function is almost linear – this equilibrium can
be described well not only by cubic polynomials but in fact by a linear function. This is not
true for the equilibrium in Figure 2 - a linear approximation there does very poorly. Clearly
this issues is partly related to the choice of Θˆ. In order to investigate under which conditions
there exist competitive equilibria that can be well described by low-degree polynomials, it is
useful to introduce uncertainty into the model. This allows for an endogenous determination
of Θˆ and one can ask the question if there exists some recursive equilibrium (i.e. some Θˆ,
ρˆ) which can be described by simple functions.
4.3.1 Uncertainty
As a second example, I therefore introduce uncertainty in the model.
Example 2 Suppose S = 2, shocks are iid with pi = 1/2, markets are complete, i.e. there are
two Arrow securities. Suppose endowments are given by
e0 = (e0(1), e0(2)) = (1, 1.25), e1 = (2.5, 2), e2 = (0.5, 0.5),
and suppose βas = 1 for all a = 0, 1, 2, s ∈ S.
It turns out in the computed approximate equilibrium, the approximate consumption
functions are almost linear and in fact the two functions ρˆc1(θ−, 1) = 1.1422 + 0.32912θ−
and ρˆc1(θ−, 2) = 1.3178 + 0.3100θ−, describe the consumption functions of the computed
equilibrium within 0.005, with Θ1 = [−0.18, 0.01] and Θ2 = [−0.28,−0.12]. There are no
other competitive equilibria within 0.9 of the linear functions (that are not with 0.005 of
the functions).
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Of course, the quality of the approximation can be increased further by using higher
degree polynomials. In this example, a cubic polynomial describes the exact equilibrium
within δ = 0.0001.
4.4 Approximate generalizations
The example raises the question if typically equilibria can be described by linear functions or
if this is somehow a fluke. In order to investigate this issue more closely, I focus on the case
with two shocks, and sample randomly endowments and taste-parameters, β. I approximate
the computed consumption functions by polynomials of degrees 1, 2 and 3 and report the
fraction of cases for which the approximation constitutes a δ-approximate equilibrium for
δ = 0.001, δ = 0.005, δ = 0.01, δ = 0.05. I consider an error above 0.05 unacceptable. For
the linear case, I compare the linear approximation to the cubic approximation to establish
that the true solution in fact sometimes cannot be well approximated by a linear function.
Since I consider a semi-algebraic problem, I can interpret the results following Kubler
(2007). There I show that this random sampling proves that with high probability the
Lebesgue measure of set parameters is close to its empirical frequency. Alternatively one
can simply see this exercise as a way to generate many examples.
I first consider the case of βas = 1 for all a, s and i.i.d. and equiprobable shocks. I sample
endowments uniformly from [0.01, 2]6, i.e. in each shock, each individual’s endowment lies
between 0.01 and 2. I draw 1000 vectors of endowments.
Degree of approx. \ δ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 > 0.05
Linear 12.5 24.3 23.1 37.0 3.1
Quadratic 79.5 17.4 1.4 1.3 0
Cubic 98.2 1.4 0 0 0
Table 1: complete markets, no taste shocks
Table 1 shows the percentage of cases that a δ robust equilibrium could be found for
several values of δ. In around 0.2 percent of the cases the numerical procedure failed
and it was impossible to determine if the computed equilibrium approximates a robust
exact equilibrium. The linear approximation turns out to be very accurate only for 13
percent of the cases. For 40 percent, the deviation between exact equilibrium and computed
equilibrium turns out to be larger than one percent, for 3 percent of the cases larger than 5
percent. While both quadratic and cubic approximations work very well in most cases, the
exact equilibrium cannot be described very well by linear functions.
In addition to randomly drawing endowments, I then also randomly draw (β11 , β
1
2 , β
2
1 , β
2
2)
uniformly from [0.1, 1]4. As above, endowments are drawn uniformly from [0.01, 2]6. I
compute 1000 examples which differ both in endowments and taste-parameters. Table 2
shows the results for this case.
23
Degree of approx. \ δ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 > 0.05
Linear 14.8 23.6 15.3 38.2 7.3
Quadratic 61.5 26.1 4.4 6.4 0.9
Cubic 96.1 3.1 1 .2 0 0
Table 2: complete markets, with taste shocks
The table shows that the problems become slightly harder for the linear approximation
and that now also the quadratic approximation is not extremely accurate in almost 40
percent of the cases. The cubic approximation remains very accurate in 96 percent of the
cases. As in the case without taste-shocks the numerical method fails in about 0.5 percent
of the cases.
Overall, the results show that for a large class of preference-parameters and endow-
ments there exist competitive equilibria in which individuals’ consumption can be very well
approximated by cubic functions mapping the current state to allocations.
The results also show that taking a strip around a recursive -equilibrium to construct
a robust -equilibrium set works extremely well. In the few cases where no results were
obtained, it was not clear if the failure was caused by a failure of SparsePOP in solving the
optimization problem or if in fact the construction did not produce a robust -equilibrium
set.
4.5 Constraints
Adding constraints on individuals’ possible trades will result in an approximate policy func-
tion that is not differentiable. In this case, it is clearly unlikely that the exact equilibrium
can be approximated well by cubic polynomials. However, it turns out that piece-wise
quadratic functions will do the job. This is not completely obvious as non-differentiability
in the policy-function for one shock can lead to non-differentiabilities in policy functions of
another. The following example illustrates the point.
Example 3 Suppose S = 2, shocks are iid with pi = 1/2, markets are complete, but agents
face the borrowing constraint θ · q ≥ −1/2. Suppose endowments are given by
e0 = (e0(1), e0(2)) = (1/2, 3), e1 = (1, 4), e2 = (1/2, 1),
and suppose βas = 1 for all a = 0, 1, 2, s ∈ S.
In this example Θ1 = (−0.3, 0.05) and Θ2 = (−1.5,−0.45). It turns out that the
borrowing constraint becomes binding in shock 2 at around θ− ∼ −1.377.
I approximate the consumption policy in shock 1 with a quadratic function and the
consumption function is shock 2 with a piecewise linear function consisting of two pieces.
That is
ρˆc2(θ−, 1) = 0.8141 + 0.5955θ− − 0.1928θ2−
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ρˆc2(θ−, 2) =
{
2.686 + 0.4086 θ− ≤ −1.377
3.5 + θ−, θ− ≥ −1.377
Clearly, the function ρˆ(., 2) cannot be approximated well by a low degree polynomial. I use
SparsePOP to check that this approximation is within 0.001 of an exact robust equilibrium.
For this, one needs to solve the maximization problem twice, once for each piece of the
piece-wise linear function, imposing as an additional constraint that choices in the current
period lead to a state in the next period corresponding to the piece of the function under
consideration.
It is crucial to use a quadratic as opposed to a linear for shock 1, for the linear approxi-
mation the error larger than 0.008 otherwise. It is interesting to note that even with degree
6 polynomial, one cannot achieve a good approximation for ρˆ(., 2) – only δ = 0.05 can be
achieved. While the ’true’ consumption function (if it is a function) for shock 1 also will
likely have a non-differentiability at the point where the constraint next period becomes
binding, which is around θ− = −0.21. However, a quadratic function approximates with
high accuracy.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a computationally feasible test to verify that a computed candidate
equilibrium is close to a competitive equilibrium of a dynamic stochastic economy. The
result has both practical and theoretical relevance.
In practice researchers often need to argue that their computation of dynamic equilibria
are accurate. The most consistent method is verifying that relative errors in Euler-equations
are small, but several other more ad-hoc methods are used in practice. The method in
this paper develops a method to compute the exact deviation between computed function
and actual equilibrium. The computation is relatively efficient and can be carried out for
medium-sized problems. In particular, in the above example, the method also works well if
one increases the number of shocks to 8 (which results in a system of 16 equations for h).
It is subject to further research to explore if the software package can be used for models
with many agents or models with production and to find ways to make the method feasible
for large problems and to develop easy-to-use code that can be used in applications.
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